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The data presented  in  chapter  5  already  indicate that the countries 
covered  in  the projects have,  at least in the “revealed” sense, their 
comparative  advantage  in  the  industrial  sector  in  relatively  labor- 
intensive industries. Those data provide, however, only a first and de- 
scriptive approximation to the link between alternative trade strategies 
and employment. 
In this chapter we proceed further by examining the available data on 
various characteristics of factor inputs and trade that shed more light on 
the relationship between trade strategies and employment. At this stage 
the spirit continues to be “descriptive,” in the sense that the coefficients 
are taken as given, without analysis of the underlying influences shaping 
them. 
6.1 
One of the empirical regularities that emerge in studies of  developed 
countries’ trade is the significance of  indicators of  skills as determinants 
of comparative advantage, however defined (see Branson and Monoyios 
1977; Baldwin 1979). The theory developed in chapter 4  did not essen- 
tially distinguish between skilled and unskilled labor, but it makes more 
sense to regard the skills as a component of capital or as a separate factor 
of  production than to regard all labor as homogeneous.’ 
It was indicated in chapter 2 that not all labor is homogeneous and that, 
in particular, education, training, experience, and other factors influence 
the productivity of  a worker or groups of workers. Despite the desirabil- 
ity of attempting uniform estimates across countries of the skill composi- 
tion of employment in different industries, we recognized from the outset 
of  the project that the problems involved would be insuperable. It is 
difficult enough to obtain data within a country that contains enough 
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information on worker attributes to permit estimation of  their human 
capital or other measures of  skills and training; across countries, any 
attempt to estimate skills comparably would  be  impossible not  only 
because categories differ but also because it is not clear that units of 
measurement, such as years of  schooling, have similar economic mean- 
ings. Country authors were therefore asked to use their judgment in 
seeking indicators of  skills. In some cases, such as Thailand, they were 
severely constrained by the absence of  data. In other cases considerable 
analysis was possible. 
In this section the results of  the individual authors’ analyses are re- 
viewed. The reader should be cautioned, however, that interpretation of 
the results  is  incomplete until  the labor  market  has been  analyzed, 
especially with regard to the determinants of  wage structure and other 
factors that influence the choice’of factor intensity, including the use of 
skilled or unskilled workers. Here focus is simply upon the differentials 
that exist, without regard to how much greater or less those differentials 
might have been had the trade regime or factor market structure been 
altered. 
The country authors’ estimates of the separate coefficients  for skilled, 
unskilled, and managerial labor inputs are reported in table 6.1. There 
appear to be large and systematic differences between skill coefficients 
for HOS exportable and HOS import-competing industries. They are 
more pronounced than differences in overall labor coefficients. These 
differences prevail despite a variety of  factors, discussed in chapter 7 
below, that tend to keep them below the level they might assume in the 
absence of factor market distortions. They are confirmed not only by the 
individual country studies, but also by  results reported in  Trade and 
Employment in Developing Countries, vol. 2,  Factor Supply and Substitu- 
tion (Krueger  1982) in the papers by  Henderson  and by  Corbo and 
Meller.z 
It  should  be recognized that  the definition of  skills differed from 
country to country, depending on data availability. Since coefficients 
generally pertained to urban-sector production in HOS exporting and 
import-competing industries, it is a reasonable conjecture that in most 
cases the term “unskilled” labor refers to individuals  without any training 
beyond primary school. In many countries, however, some degree of 
literacy is a prerequisite for factory employment, and the unskilled labor 
coefficients  reported here may in fact reflect the number of persons in the 
least educated or trained category eligible for employment in any mod- 
ern-sector activity. 
There were only four countries-Brazil,  Chile, the Ivory Coast, and 
Tunisia-for  which authors had sufficient data to compute direct-plus- 
home-goods-indirect labor coefficients. In all cases the pattern was very 
similar to that shown in table 6.1. 106  Chapter Six 
Table 6.1  Ratio of Direct Coefficients of HOS Exportable to HOS 
Import-Competing Industries per DVA, Managerial, 
Skilled, and Unskilled Labor 
Country  Period  Unskilled  Skilled  Managerial 
Brazil  1959 
1971 
Chile  1966-68 
Colom bia  1973 
Indonesia  1971 
Ivory Coast  1972 
Tunisia  1972 









.954  n.a. 
,978  n.a. 
,842  n.a. 
.519  1.231 
310  1.100 
.960  ,835 
310  n.a. 
,939  n.a. 
Notes: 
Colombia: Unskilled worker ratio refers to blue-collar workers. 
Indonesia:  “Unskilled”  is sum of  “male 0perative”and  “female operative” man-days. 
Ivory Coast: Modern sector HOS coefficients from Monson 1981, table 6.13: averages for 
exportables and import-competing industries were used. 
Uruguay: Skilled workers are “white-collar”  workers. 
For most of  the countries with results reported in table 6.1 authors 
were forced, through lack of adequate data, to use some sort of weighting 
system for various categories of labor. In some instances these categories 
were simple counts of the work force by category assigned in the census or 
labor force survey. In Tunisia, for example, data were available for seven 
categories of  labor: seasonal employees, apprentices, unskilled labor, 
semiskilled and skilled labor , supervisory personnel, white-collar em- 
ployees, and management and engineers. To estimate skill content of 
different activities, Nabli formed skill indexes by taking the average wage 
in the ith skill category relative to the average wage for unskilled labor, 
wi,  and using those ratios as weights. He then formed an index, SKi,  of the 
skill content of  the jth industry 
where Sii is the number of persons with skill level i in industry j and Li is 
the total numbers of workers in industry j. 
Weights ranged from 0.36  for apprentices to 6.77 for management and 
engineers. For unskilled labor, he  added man-years of  seasonal em- 
ployees, apprentices, unskilled labor, and half of  the skilled and semi- 
skilled category. Because they are indexes, they are sensitive to choice of 
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for skilled and unskilled workers for Tunisia given in table 6.1 are based 
on those calculations. 
In an effort to avoid use of  arbitrary weights (which are especially 
flawed if  there is reason to believe that the sorts of labor market distor- 
tions  discussed in chapter 7 influence relative wages), Carvalho and 
Haddad followed an alternative pr~cedure.~  They had the advantage of 
having previous work by  Senna (1975), who has estimated an earnings 
function for Brazil. He had estimated the equation. 
(2)  1nwi = (Yo + ppsj + pJj  + p&  + uj, 
where Si  is the number of full years of  formal school attendance and  .Ti is 
number of years in the labor force for the ith worker. Carvalho and 
Haddad had data on the characteristics of  the Brazilian labor force in 
individual industries and used Senna’s regression estimates of  the earn- 
ings function to estimate the “human capital content” of  the labor force 
in  industry.  Using those  estimates, they  calculated the  average skill 
intensities for expanding exportable and import-competing production 
and transformed those into an index by setting 100 equal to the average 
manufacturing wage in 1970. 
The range of  skill intensity over the twenty-two industries in their 
computation was from 89.4 (construction) to 165.4 (oil and derivatives). 
However, seventeen of their twenty-two observations fell within 10 per- 
cent of the mean. For 1959, as can be seen from table 6.1, the average skill 
content of  exportable industries was below that for import-competing 
industries: for import-competing industries the figure was 100.3 percent, 
while for exports it was 95.7. By 1971  both import-competing and export 
industries had wages above the average, perhaps reflecting the fact that in 
Brazil home goods are intensive in the use of  unskilled labor. Carvalho 
and Haddad also compared their estimates for 1971  of skill intensity with 
those they would have obtained had they used a direct measure of the 
ratio of the industry’s wages to the average industrial wage. For 1971  their 
index of  skill intensity was 111.9 for import-competing activities and 
109.5 for exportables, reflecting a difference of  2.1 percent (contrasted 
with the range of  about 20  percent).  Had they instead used average 
wages, they would have calculated an index of  130 for import-competing 
activities and 120 for exportables, giving a difference of about 8 percent. 
While one cannot rely too heavily upon a single instance, it is somewhat 
reassuring that the direction of difference in skill intensity and the general 
order of  magnitude appears to be much the same regardless of  which 
measure is used to reflect it. 
Returning to  the data in table 6.1, when man-days per unit of DVA are 
broken down into skilled man-days, unskilled man-days, and managerial 
man-days, the picture that emerges is that unskilled labor coefficients in 
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exporting industries than are total labor coefficients. In each case for 
which a breakdown is available, the unskilled labor coefficient ratio for 
exportables exceeds that for total labor. Likewise, in all cases the skilled 
labor coefficient in import-competing industries exceeds that in export- 
able industries. Data from Hong Kong show a similar picture. Recall that 
the overall ratio of  direct labor coefficients was 0.719 in 1973. By con- 
trast, the ratio of  professional labor in import-competing industries to 
that in exportable industries was 1.77. Nogues likewise estimated a higher 
skill coefficient of import-competing industries, by 27 percent when a skill 
classification  was used. Use of average wages as a proxy for skills yielded 
much the same order of  magnitude. 
Thus, based on the evidence from the countries covered in the project, 
it appears that not only are the HOS exportables generally more labor- 
using than HOS import-competing goods, but their input of  unskilled 
labor is greater than that of import-competing industries by an even wider 
margin, while import-competing industries place a greater demand on the 
skilled labor forces in those countries. 
6.2  Patterns by Direction of Trade 
We saw in chapter 4  that there are a priori grounds for expecting 
differences  in  factor intensity  both  between  exports destined to de- 
veloped (more capital-abundant) countries and those destined to other 
developing countries and between imports by source. This expectation 
was in general borne out by the results of the individual country authors. 
Table 6.2 provides the basic data from the individual country studies 
and Hong Kong. In some instances, notably Indonesia and Hong Kong, a 
sufficiently large fraction of  exports is destined for developed countries 
that it is difficult to attach significance to the separate coefficients. In 
other cases, however, the trade with other developing countries is siz- 
able, and differences in factor proportions are considerable. For Chile, 
for example, about half of all HOS exports are destined to other LAFTA 
(Latin American Free Trade Area) countries. Chile’s exports to de- 
veloped countries have a labor coefficient of  61, contrasted with 29 for 
exports to the LAFTA region. Uruguay, likewise, has sizable exports to 
LAFTA and, again, these exports appear to be far less labor intensive 
than exports to developed countries. For Brazil, too, LAFTA exports are 
less labor intensive than other exports. 
For the Ivory Coast and Pakistan there are also pronounced differences 
on the import-competing side: for those two countries, production com- 
peting with imports from other LDCs was far more labor intensive than 
was  production  competing  with  imports originating from  developed 
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Table 6.2  Direct Labor Coefficients per Unit of 
DVA by Direction of Trade 
HOS Exportables  HOS Import-Competing 
Country  Period  DC  LDC  Total  DC  LDC  Total 
Argentina  1973  164  147  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Brazil  1959  115  141  115  ma.  ma.  128 
1970  89  79  87  n.a.  n.a.  71 
1972  109  78  87  n.a.  n.a.  71 
Chile  1966-68  61  29  34  43  43  43 
Colombia  1970  28  21  24  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1973  32  24  29  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Hong Kong  1973  75  67  73  62  55  60 
Indonesia  1971  2,176  2,149  2,175  994  1,117  1,038 
Ivory Coast  1972  n.a.  n.a.  2,488  1,520  1,743  1,652 
Pakistan  1969-70  90  88  88  70  120  71 
Thailand  1973  22  20  22  11  22  11 
Uruguay  1968  44 1  239  366  n.a.  n.a.  238 
Notes: 
Brazil: Data are from Carvalho and Haddad (1981), table 2.14, and represent total labor 
requirements per DVA. The numbers for developed countries are an unweighted average 
of  EEC and United States and Canada coefficients, while the LDC numbers refer to 
LAFTA trade. 
Colombia: DC figure is an unweighted average of  “United States” and “other developed 
countries.” 
Indonesia: Total man-days from Pitt 1981, table 5.15. 
Ivory Coast: Data (expressed in man-hours) taken from Monson 1981, table 6.11 and refer 
to modern HOS sectors. No breakdown of HOS exportable trade between DCs and LDCs 
was made owing to the unimportance of  the latter. 
Pakistan: Excludes PCB exports (Guisinger 1981, table 7.14). 
Thailand: Data supplied by Akrasanee 1981 for HOS import-competing  goods, exclusion  of 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco gives twenty-one for DCs and total. 
The orders of  magnitude of  difference in labor intensity according to 
export destination are in some cases as great as the differences between 
overall labor coefficients for HOS exportables and import-competing 
production. For Chile, for example, reducing one unit of DVA of export- 
able production for developed countries and replacing it with one unit of 
DVA of import-competing production would entail a net “loss” of eigh- 
teen jobs, or a reduction of  28 percent in employment. By  contrast, 
contraction of  a unit of  DVA of  HOS exportable production for other 
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domestic import-competing production would result in a change from 
twenty-nine jobs to forty-three jobs-an  increase of almost 50 percent in 
employment. To be  sure, the coefficients are not  necessarily perfect 
indicators of what would happen with an alteration in trade strategy, but 
the orders of magnitude are sufficient to suggest that it matters not only 
which sectors-NRB  or HOS-trade  originates in, but also which coun- 
tries are the trading partners. For Chile, an export promotion strategy 
based upon the LAFTA market would probably result in a shift toward 
less labor-using industries, while an export promotion  strategy based 
upon trade with the developed countries would have the opposite result. 
This finding is supportive of the observation made in chapter 3, namely 
that not all policies designated as “export promotion” really constitute an 
“export-oriented’’ trade strategy.  Uruguay and Chile, among others, 
were heavily oriented toward import substitution: the exports that were 
destined for LAFTA were subject to special inducements and repre- 
sented much more the outcome of the incentives for import substitution 
than any genuine export promotion ~rientation.~  Thus the bias of  the 
regime remained toward import substitution industries, so much so that 
there were incentives for some of those industries to export. This finding 
is of  importance in considering the overall implications of  alternative 
trade strategies for employment. I return to it in chapter 9 below. 
6.3  Evidence with Respect to Capital Intensity 
Because even graver difficulties  surround the availability  and reliability 
of data on capital stock than data on labor, primary focus in all country 
studies was on labor coefficients. In theory, of course, capital coefficients 
would be inversely related to labor coefficients in a two-factor model at 
free trade. Nonetheless, where the data permitted, authors were encour- 
aged to provide information on capital inputs. The results are summa- 
rized in table 6.3. For the countries for which data are available, except 
Chile, the results are as expected: HOS exportables were less capital- 
using than import-competing activities. For Indonesia, where Pitt had 
four proxy variables with which to approximate capital utilization, all 
show wide divergences. Only in electricity utilization was the difference 
between HOS exportables and HOS import-competing industries less 
than two to one, and even in terms of  electricity used the differential 
exceeded 50 percent. For Uruguay data were available separately for 
exports destined to DCs and to LDCs, and they are reported separately. 
As can be seen, kilowatts used per DVA in trade with developed coun- 
tries were 21 percent less than those employed in import substitution 
industries (where all HOS import-competing industries were replacing 
imports from developed  countries). For  trade with other developing 
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Table 6.3  Evidence with Regard to Capital Inputs per Unit of DVA 
HOS Import- 
HOS  Competing 
Exportables  Industries 
Argentina 
Chile 
Cost of  energy 
Thousand escudos of  fixed assets 
Hong Kong 
Profits 1973 
Depreciation  1973 
Electric motor horsepower 
Total horsepower 
Electricity used (kwh) 





Kilowatts trade with DCs 





















115  .OO” 
1,163.00 
“Per unit of  output. 
2.2 times as great as those for import-competing industries. The figures 
are, of course, even more extreme in terms of  IVA. For Chile it will be 
recalled that pulp and paper exports to LAFTA were a sufficiently large 
component of  Chile’s HOS exports that they dominated the labor coef- 
ficients. 
Overall, the available data reinforce the conclusions  emerging from the 
labor coefficients: HOS exportables tend to use more labor and less 
capital  per  unit  of  domestic value  added  than  do import-competing 
industries. 
6.4  Coefficients per Unit of International Value Added 
by Trade Categories 
As was shown in chapter 5,  consideration of  labor-or other input- 
coefficients per unit of domestic value added is appropriate if  the ques- 
tion under analysis pertains to alternative uses of given bundles of domes- 
tic resources. If, instead, one wishes to evaluate the effect of alternative 
allocations while holding the trade balance constant, coefficients  per unit 
of  international value added should be employed. These coefficients are 
closer to an efficiency notion of  factor utilization, while domestic coef- 112  Chapter Six 
ficients come closer to some representation of  a full-employment condi- 
tion. 
At free and balanced trade, of course, the industry-specific  coefficients 
are the same regardless of whether domestic or international value added 
is used, and the relationship of L/DVA and L/IVA ratios is one to one. 
Moreover, if  adequate data were available so that one could rely on 
capitalllabor ratios, the ordering of factor intensity would be invariant 
with respect to use of  domestic or international measures. 
However, when tariffs or other protective devices leads to differentials 
in the domestic/foreign price ratios for different commodities or indus- 
tries, the one-to-one relationship between IVA and DVA breaks down.5 
Even in a two-factor HOS world, it could happen that L/DVA and LAVA 
rankings were reversed. Figure 6.1 illustrates this possibility. In figure 
6.1, unit isoquants for commodities A and B are given by the uu and bb 
curves respectively. At a wagekental ratio represented by  minus the 
slope of wowo,  industry A is labor-intensive, using a combination of labor 
and capital inputs represented by the coordinates of a',  while industry B 
is more capital-using, with inputs at bo.  At input prices represented by the 
slopes of  wlwl  (which is reproduced as w2w2),  industry A would employ 
the combination of inputs indicated at u', while industry B would employ 
that represented at b'.  Thus a country with factor prices wowo  would be 
able, at free trade, to produce both commodities at a price ratio of one to 
one. A country with factor prices represented by w'wl  ( = w2w2)  would 
not be able to produce both commodities at the one-to-one price ratio. If 
the wage/;ental  ratio  represented  by  wowo  determined international 
prices of  both commodities,  a country with factor prices wlwl  could 
produce both commodities only with protection to industry B. With such 
protection (in the amount w'  -  w2  divided by Ow2),  both industries could 
produce under competitive conditions. Industry A would always be labor 
intensive in that the laborkapital ratio in that industry would exceed that 
in industry B for all common wagehental ratios. Moreover, WDVA in 
industry A would exceed that in industry B. However, LAVA in industry 
B would exceed that in industry A,  since it would require both more labor 
and more capital per unit of  output in B than in A at the factor prices 
represented by w'w'. 
The reason for this can be more readily seen in figure 6.2,  which is not 
consistent with an HOS world of incomplete specialization and identical 
production functions between  countries.6 In figure 6.2, isoquants for 
commodities A and B are drawn for a unit of output of each commodity 
evaluated in domestic prices.  Given the domestic factor prices repre- 
sented by the slope of the linepdp,  factor proportions uo and bo  would be 
employed  in  the two industries.  Industry A  is again labor intensive. 
Suppose now that industry A is the export industry, and not subject to 
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world price ratio is ppw,  then labor per unit of international value added 
in industry B would be od times the ratio of  domestic value added to 
international value added, or obloc. As can be seen, the proportionate 
difference between ob and oc is sufficient so that labor (and capital) per 
IVA in B exceeds that in A. 
Regardless of which of the two underlying cases causes a reversal, it is 
apparent that a reversal of labor intensities between a DVA and an IVA 
basis represents a case paralleling “absolute inefficiency’’  in the engineer- 
ing sense: when the ratios reverse, it would have been possible to achieve 
more international value added per unit of labor and of capital in the less 
protected industry. Stated otherwise, when a relatively labor-intensive 
commodity in a labor-abundant country uses more labor and more capital 
per unit of IVA (while using less labor per unit of DVA), there is no set of 
relative input prices at which it would be efficient to operate the industry 
using existing factor proportions.’ 
With that background in mind, the WIVA coefficients  from the country 
studies can be analyzed.* They are presented in table 6.4, in a format 
comparable to that of table 5.1  for purposes of comparison. Recall that all 
ratios  are expressed  relative  to the  labor  per  IVA in  HOS import- 
competing activities. To transform estimates of labor per DVA into labor 
coefficients per unit of IVA, the L/DVA coefficients must be multiplied 
by the ratio of  DVA to IVA (i.e., one plus the rate of  effective protec- 
tion). If  ERPs for all exportables were zero, the L/DVA and L/IVA 
would be identical for exporting industries.  If  a regime were  biased 
toward import substitution, so that ERPs for import-competing indus- 
tries were positive, WDVA would be less than LAVA. This is what leads 
to the possibility of reversal, especially when there is negative effective 
protection  for exportables (so that  L/IVA is less than  L/DVA) and 
positive effective protection for import substitutes (so that L/DVA is less 
than LAVA). 
In practice, some exportable activities have positive levels of  protec- 
tion, and others have negative ones, so that the relationship between 
exporting and import substitution WDVA and L/IVA ratios is not quite 
as straightforward as it at first sight appears. 
Nonetheless, as can be seen from table 6.4, the ratio of  labor coef- 
ficients in  HOS exportable industries to those in  import substitution 
activities is generally less when expressed for IVA than for DVA, reflect- 
ing the general bias of the trade regimes toward import substitution. For 
Chile, for example, the ratio of  labor requirements overall for HOS 
exportables to HOS import-competing activities per DVA  was 0.8,  while 
the ratio is 0.47 for IVA. Only in Pakistan and the Ivory Coast does the 
ratio rise, since HOS exports received positive levels of  effective protec- 
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Table 6.4  Direct Labor Coefficients per Unit of IVA (Ratio of Direct 
Coefficients in Designated Trade Category to Direct Requirements 
per  IVA in HOS Import-Competing Activities) 
HOS Exports 
Manufac-  PCB 
tures Not  Manufac- 
Country  PCB  tures  Total 
Argentina  n.a.  n.a.  .55 
Chile  n.a.  n.a.  .47 
Colombia  n.a.  n.a.  1.63 
Indonesia  1.31"  n.a.  1.65" 
Ivory Coast 
Modern sector  n.a.  n.a.  1  .42b 
Total  n.a.  n.a.  1.33 
Pakistan  1.28'  n.a.  1.53' 
Thailand  2.36  .85  1.23 
Tunisia  n.a.  n.a.  .91 
Uruguay  n.a.  n.a.  .66 
"Direct-plus-home-goods-indirect labor per unit of IVA. For comparison, the comparable 
ratios for DVA are 1.46 for non-PCB manufactures and 1.92 for all HOS exports relative to 
import-competing HOS goods. 
bSee note to table 5.1 on Ivory Coast. Values refer to ratios of  direct-plus-home-goods 
indirect labor p,er unit of  IVA. 
'Direct-plus-home-goods  indirect labor per unit of  IVA from Guisinger 1981, table 7.12. 
For comparison, the figures for DVA are 1.41 and 1.30. 
There are three cases of  reversals: Argentine,  Tunisian, and Uru- 
guayan HOS exports. In those instances, labor coefficients for import- 
competing activities per IVA exceed those for exportable activities. The 
reasons are exactly those illustrated in figures 6.1 and 6.2: the ratio of 
DVA to IVA exceeds the proportionate difference in labor inputs. In 
Uruguay the difference is extremely large: HOS exportables took 50 
percent more labor per unit of  domestic value added than did import- 
competing goods, but only two-thirds as much labor per unit of interna- 
tional value  added. This reflects the very high degree of  protection 
accorded to import-competing industries (see table 7.1) in Uruguay. 
The order of  magnitude of  the Uruguayan reversal can be seen from 
the following calculation. Suppose the direct capital employed in produc- 
ing one million dollars of  IVA in import-competing industries in Uru- 
guay, as reflected in thousand kilowatts of  energy consumption (4,576) 116  Chapter Six 
had  instead been  allocated  to HOS  exporting industries.  In import- 
competing industries, 934 workers were employed per million dollars of 
IVA;  4,576 thousand kilowatts would have been the capital coefficient for 
$3.1 million of  IVA in HOS exportables to developed countries. The 
number of workers per million dollars IVA in HOS exportables was 707; 
it would therefore, at constant coefficients, have taken 2,191 workers, 
compared with the 934 in import substitution industries, to employ the 
same amount of capital (if energy consumption is an adequate proxy for 
capital inputs), and the international value of  output could have been 
three times as great. To be sure, the estimates are imprecise, and in any 
event the Uruguayan economy could not for long have sustained such a 
shift in resources. Labor would undoubtedly have become scarcer, and 
factor proportions would have altered in response to an altered wage/ 
rental ratio. Nonetheless, the numbers are large enough to indicate a 
sizable loss in potential welfare given the actual coefficients and trade 
strategy followed. 
For most countries, of  course, the numbers are not quite as extreme, 
though for both Chile and Tunisia the differences are significant.  There is 
no single measure that accurately reflects the degree of  bias toward 
import substitution in a country, but the evidence in the country studies 
suggests that the three countries with reversals were also among those 
with the greatest bias toward import substitution. Certainly the differen- 
tials between L/DVA and L/IVA ratios are much smaller in the Ivory 
Coast  and  Indonesia,  where  there is considerable  evidence that the 
degree of  protection to import-competing industries was substantially 
smaller (iee table 8.1). 
If  one works only with capitaVlabor ratios, as seems reasonable given 
the underlying HOS model, the fact that L/DVA and LAVA can reverse 
may be overlooked. Indeed, at the outset of the project we did not expect 
that such an outcome was possible: the reason for focusing upon labor 
coefficients rather than laborkapital ratios was that we believed data on 
numbers of  workers, with or without  adjustments for hours worked, 
skills, and experience, would be somewhat more reliable and generally 
available than data on capital stock employed. That L/DVA and L/IVA 
ratios diverge as much as they do points to the importance of  examining 
capital and labor coefficients separately, even when reliable data are 
available for both, in the presence of  significant variation in rates of 
effective protection. 
6.5  Conclusions 
Chapters 5 and 6 have been essentially descriptive, examining  evidence 
on the labor coefficients  for various categories of tradables and other data 
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ployment. Those coefficients are the outcome of  market processes and 
government regulations  in the countries covered by  the project, and 
consideration of  the  determinants of  the coefficients must  take into 
account analysis of  factor markets in chapters 7 and 8. Nonetheless, in 
light of the underlying theory suggesting that, in the presence of differen- 
tiated incentives and factor market imperfections, little systematic rela- 
tionship can  be  expected  between  factor inputs and the commodity 
composition  of  trade, it is interesting  that, in  most  of  the countries 
covered by  the project, production of  HOS exportables was, by  and 
large,  considerably more  labor  intensive than  production of  import- 
competing goods. This picture emerges when considering employment 
coefficients per  unit  of  DVA; if  the size of  the capital stock is  the 
constraint upon  the size of  the manufacturing sector, then  the clear 
implication is that employment could expand more under increases in 
HOS exportable production than under HOS import-competing produc- 
tion. This follows both because there would be more demand for labor in 
HOS exportable industries and because capital coefficients in those in- 
dustries are generally lower, implying that total manufacturing value 
added could expand. In terms of  IVA, the differential in employment 
coefficients is generally smaller, in large part because import-competing 
industries receive higher effective protection than do HOS exportables. 
As a consequence it can, and in some cases does, take both more labor 
and more capital per unit of IVA in import-competing industries than in 
exportables. This is more a reflection of  the economic inefficiency of 
some of import-competing industries than an indication of employment 
potential: capital/labor ratios are not altered by changing from units of 
DVA to IVA. 
When attention turns to the composition of employment, especially in 
its skill dimensions, once again the evidence is strong that HOS export- 
ables use more unskilled labor and less skilled and managerial labor than 
import-competing industries. This result warrants careful analysis, espe- 
cially in light of the determinants of wage structure in the project coun- 
tries. Even at this juncture, however, the straightforward idea, emanat- 
ing from the HOS model, that international trade enables developing 
countries  to  substitute  their  relatively  abundant  factor-unskilled 
labor-for  their relatively scarce factor, seems to be borne out by the data 
despite whatever factor market imperfections may have influenced the 
results. 
Finally, there is evidence that regional trading arrangements, espe- 
cially LAFTA, induce a pattern of  trade that uses factor proportions in 
exportables much more like those in import-competing industries than 
those in HOS exportables to developed countries. Such a result makes 
intuitive sense: if  all LDCs have a comparative advantage in the world 
economy in a variety of  goods that are relatively intensive in the use of 118  Chapter Six 
unskilled labor, it is unlikely that they will be able to penetrate each 
other’s  markets significantly-transport  cost differentials, combined with 
protection, presumably deter what trade might otherwise be profitable, 
and the HOS model in any event predicts that gains from trade will be 
large between countries with dissimilar factor endowments. It therefore 
seems plausible that, when tariff preferences are extended, they tend to 
encourage export of  import substitution industries’ output within the 
region.  Whether this  increases or reduces  real  incomes depends on 
whether the imports of  capital-intensive goods from regional trading 
partners replace even higher-priced domestic output or whether instead 
they replace imports from developed countries. If it is the latter, there is 
clear evidence of trade diversion, with presumed attendant welfare losses 
from regional preferential arrangements, and very different employment 
implications for a given trade strategy depending on whether that strategy 
is global or regional in nature. 